The keywords in the section are: “No court of the session may take note of an offence as a court of the court of origin unless the case was committed by a judge under this Code.” The above provision states that a case must first be referred by the magistrate to the Court of Session. The second condition is that the Court of Session may not become aware of the offence exercising its original jurisdiction until after the case has been committed. Although Mr. Dave has attempted to suggest that the conclusion given in section 193 does not concern knowledge of a criminal offence, but the obligation order issued by the learned judge, we are not inclined to accept such a statement in the clear wording of section 193 that the Court of Session may take note of offences under that section. 13. Mr. Dave argued that, given the provisions of section 204 of the Code, which required some degree of application of the mind on the part of the learned magistrate, the need to apply his mind in an independent investigation was minimal. Since the magistrate was not allowed to submit to article 190 of the Code, there was strong pressure for the case to be attached to the Court of Session without leaving the learned magistrate the choice to resort to another course of action. In support of his observations, Mr. Dave referred to that court`s decision in Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397], taking into account the question of the powers of the court at the stage of knowledge of an offence under articles 190, 200 and 202 of the Code and deciding that at the stage of knowledge of a criminal offence, the court should take into account only the avoidances formulated in the complaint, since at this stage, the court is not required to: Sift through or assess the evidence. 7. Mr Brijender Chahar, lead counsel, appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs in Criminal Appeal No.

148 of 2003, filed by Dharam Pal and Others, arguing that the Learned Session Judge and the High Court had wrongly held that the executing magistrate had the power to process a request for protest in order to summon the plaintiffs who had not been identified as defendants in the indictment. Lord. Chahar claimed that, under the guise of a protest petition, the magistrate had usurped the powers of the session judge under article 319 of the Code in a case heard exclusively by the Court of Session. Mr. Chahar insisted that once a police report was submitted to a judge demonstrating that an offence had been committed exclusively by the Court of Session, the magistrate had no other function than to commit the same thing before the Court of Session, even if he was convinced in the investigation of the police report: that the other items mentioned in column 2 of the police report are also intended for a trial period. Mr. Chahar argued that the magistrate had exceeded his jurisdiction and that both the session judge and the High Court had misinterpreted the provisions of sections 190, 193 and 209 of the Code in order to enforce the order of the learned judge. In this context, Mr. Chahar focused on the provisions of the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure and the corresponding provisions of that Code of Criminal Procedure, which replaced the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure.

The learned lawyer pointed out that under article 207A of the 1898 Code, the magistrate was required to hold a mini-trial before referring the matter to the Court of Session, while article 190 of the 1973 Code allows the judge responsible to take note of any crime: 10. Mr. Amarendra Sharan, senior learned counsel, for the plaintiff in Criminal Appeal No. 1334 of 2005, put forward another reason that the learned judge`s order, upheld by the Supreme Courts, violated the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, since the learned judge issued subpoenas to the persons listed in column 2. without following the procedure described in sections 190, 200, 202 and subsequently 204 of the Code. Lord. Sharan argued that when the judge decided to take note of the motion for protest filed in relation to the indictment filed by the investigating authorities, he should have resorted to the provisions relating to the taking of notes of the indictment on the basis of a complaint within the meaning of Article 190(1), point (a) of that code. As this had not been done, the decision ordering the summons against the complainants violated article 21 of the Constitution and could therefore be set aside. Simply put, if a judge takes note of a person other than a police officer or to his or her own knowledge, the defendant may change judges as he or she wishes before collecting evidence. Subsection 190(2) provides that the second class judge may be authorized by the Chief Justice to take note of the judge in accordance with subsection 190(1). Under Article 190, any first- and second-class judge may take note of any offence – this implies the intention to initiate legal proceedings in relation to a crime or to take steps to see if there is a basis for initiating the judicial proceedings. It is commonplace for this court, before taking note of it, to ensure that elements of the alleged offence are present or not.

A court can only take note of it once, after which it becomes a “functus officio”. Contrary to the above, a claim for rights was filed with the competent court of first instance against the plaintiffs and defendants under Articles 304-B and 498-A of the ICC, but it was rejected. The case was then referred back to the Court of First Instance for trial under Article 306 of the ICC. A similar request was again preferred, which was approved by the Court of Sessions taking note of the offences committed against the complainants and their sons under Articles 304-B and 498-A of the ICC and, in the alternative, Article 306 of the ICC. Section 21. Section 190, which has already been extracted herein, authorizes any first class or second class judge who has special authority on that behalf in accordance with subsection (2) to take note of any offence in three contingencies. In this case, these are the provisions of paragraph 190(1)(b) because a police report was filed by the police under subsection 173(3) of the Code, which sends a defendant to trial, while the names of the other defendants are included in column 2 of the report. The facts, as they result from the documents on file and the oral submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, indicate that, after receiving such a police report, the learned judge did not immediately refer the case to the Court of Session, but was treated as a motion for protest in response to an objection raised on behalf of the complainant. Subpoenas were issued to the accused, who had been named in column 2 of the indictment, without further investigation, as provided for in §§ 190, 200 or even 202 of the Code, but were summoned only on the basis of the police report. The learned judge did not accept the investigator`s final report against the accused, whose name appeared in column 2, because he was satisfied that prima facie evidence of the trial had also been presented against him and had summoned her to stand trial with the other accused. Nafe Singh The questions arising from the procedure used by the learned judge to summon the applicants to trial with Nafe Singh have already been set out in paragraph 4 of the present judgment.