The conflict between legal positivism and natural law is often treated as the most fundamental issue in legal philosophy, dividing the field into two hostile and irreconcilable camps. Positivists characterize the doctrines of natural law as beliefs based on metaphysical or religious ideas incompatible with the principles of scientific thought. Proponents of the theory of natural law accuse its antagonists of not understanding the realm of mind and value, a realm that is quite real, although it cannot be discovered or described by sensory experience. To some extent, the discussion has been confusing due to a lack of clarity about the meaning of “legal positivism,” a term that is rarely, if ever, precisely defined. The most acute aspect of the controversy – namely the criticism of the attitude reflected in the German slogan “Gesetz is Gestz” as a moral position partly responsible for the Hitler regime – has nothing to do with legal positivism, which is well understood. Rather, it is a controversy between two divergent schools of natural law. This chapter takes up the same line of investigation and treats it in a way that is possible in the oral presentation. It focuses on the meaning and function of the concept of validity in legal theory. However, the most influential criticisms of Austin`s version of the ancestry thesis are due to H. L.A. Hart`s revolutionary work, The Concept of Law. Hart points out that Austin`s theory provides, at best, a partial representation of legal validity because it focuses on one type of rule, namely one that requires citizens to “take or abstain from certain actions, whether they like it or not” (Hart 1994, p. 81).

While any legal system must include so-called primary rules that govern the behavior of citizens, Hart believes that a system consisting solely of such restrictions on liberty found in criminal law is at best a rudimentary or primitive legal system. Hart also criticizes Austin`s view that legal obligation is essentially coercion. According to Hart, there is no difference between the Austinian ruler, who rules by coercive behavior, and the shooter who orders someone to hand over his money. In both cases, the subject can presumably be characterized as “obligated” to obey orders, but not “conscientious” or “obliged” to do so (Hart 1994, p. 80). In Hart`s view, the mere use of coercive force can never lead to a legal or other obligation. Austin`s view is difficult to reconcile with constitutional law in the United States. The courts regard the procedural and substantive provisions of the Constitution as limitations on legal validity. The Supreme Court, for example, has ruled that “an unconstitutional act is not a law; it does not confer any rights; it does not impose any obligations; it is, from a legal point of view, so ineffective as if it had never been adopted. (Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)).

Moreover, these restrictions claim to be legal restrictions: the supremacy clause in Article VI of the Constitution states that “[t]he Constitution … is the supreme law of the land; and the judges of each State are bound by it. Many companies offer single sign-on between the company`s website and Oxford Academic. For example, if the registration area of a journal displays the message “Registration through the company`s website”: For example, according to the U.S. recognition rule, a federal law is legally valid only if it has been enacted in accordance with the procedural requirements described in the constitutional body and in accordance with the first fourteen amendments. Since, in Hart`s view, the U.S. recognition rule is a social rule, U.S. officials must agree on the procedures that the federal government must follow when passing laws, the set of penalties that make up the first fourteen amendments, and the requirement that federal laws comply with these changes. Jules Coleman replies that if the rule of recognition is a social rule, Hart`s view implies that there must be general agreement among those responsible for a legal system on the norms that constitute the rule of recognition, but this does not mean that there cannot be disagreement as to what those norms require in a particular case: From Hart`s perspective, Austin`s emphasis on coercive violence leads to: that he neglects the existence of a second type of primary rule that gives citizens the power to create, modify, and extinguish the rights and obligations of others.