In Snyder v. Phelps (2011), it was argued that three criteria were necessary: immediacy, closeness, and instinct (a target reaction, according to Justice Ginsburg). Even “outrageous” and “hurtful” speeches like: “God hates the United States/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is doomed,” “Don`t pray for the United States,” “Thank God for the IEDs,” “Thank God for the dead soldiers,” “Pope in hell,” “Priests rape boys,” “God hates faggots,” “Faggot Doom Nations,” “You go to hell,” and “God hates you” is considered a public debate. especially if they are carried out on public lands and require “special” First Amendment protection. [8] The lonely dissenting judge Samuel Alito compared the protests of members of the Westboro Baptist Church to combative words and personal character and therefore not to protected speech. The majority disagreed, stating that the protesters` speech was not personal, but public, and that local laws that can protect attendees at protesters` funerals are appropriate to protect those in times of emotional distress. A year after Cohen, the Supreme Court overturned a defendant`s conviction for a violation of the Georgia Peace Act in Gooding v. Wilson. James Wilson told a police officer, “White son of a bitch, I`m going to kill you” and “Son of a bitch, I`m going to choke you to death.” For these words, Wilson was arrested and convicted of misconduct. He was charged under a law that defined disorderly conduct as: “Any person who, without provocation, acts by and in the presence of others.

insulting language or offensive language that tends to cause a breach of the peace. are guilty of an offence. In judging the battleword doctrine at this point, it is important to note the speech involved in Gooding. While attacking a police officer, Gooding shouted, “White son of a bitch, I`m going to kill you.” “Son of a bitch, I`m going to suffocate you to death.” and “Son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I`ll cut you all to pieces.” If this speech is not a fighting word, it is difficult to think of a speech that would be admissible. In the second type, criminal charges are dropped against the person who then sues for violating their First Amendment free speech rights. He or she alleges that the police violated his or her right to freedom of expression by punishing him or her (in the form of arrest and possibly criminal charges) for protecting freedom of expression. The police counter that the person fought words and that the police should be granted qualified immunity because a reasonable police officer in this situation would not know whether the person`s speech is combat speech or protected speech. In several subsequent decisions, the court continued to restrict the circumstances in which individuals could be punished for offensive language. For example, in Cohen v. California (1971), the High Court ruled that a person cannot be prosecuted if he wears a jacket marked “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse.

Unfortunately, to this day, administrators knowingly or unknowingly attempt to use the battleword doctrine to justify punishing students for offensive statements. But these decisions are often made behind closed doors at a disciplinary committee hearing or are used as a “bargaining chip” to force students to undergo compulsory education in “tolerance” or face a harsher sentence. “An accused can be convicted of misconduct on the basis of words of combat, without the prosecution having to prove that violence actually took place. The focus is on the nature of the words and the circumstances in which they were spoken, rather than the actual response. The actual reaction of the addressee or object of the words is relevant, but is not decisive in determining whether the utterances meet the combat word test. [Statement v. Clay, CX-99-343 (Minn.App.) (14.09.99), citing In re M.A.H., 572 N.W.2d 752 (Minn.App. 1997).] The battle word doctrine allows the government to restrict freedom of expression if it is likely to incite immediate violence or retaliation by the recipients of the words. While this doctrine remains a notable exception to First Amendment-protected freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of this doctrine when governments seek to restrict free speech. Justice Brennan concluded that this bill violated First Amendment freedoms because it was not limited to words of combat. He argued that “the prohibition on the use of `abhorrent language` includes words that do not `cause harm by their mere pronunciation or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace`. Brennan ruled that the Louisiana Supreme Court did not limit the law to fighting words.

In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the Supreme Court noted that the “First Amendment prevents the government from punishing expressive speech and behavior because it disapproves of the ideas expressed.” Even though words are considered fighting words, the First Amendment still protects speech if the restriction of speech is based on discrimination based on point of view. In Feiner v. People of State of New York (1951), the Supreme Court held that, like the doctrine of fighting words, incitement to riot that creates a clear and present danger is also not protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court was re-established with the definition of fighting words in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen, the petitioner, was convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket reading “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse.

In overturning his conviction, the court ruled that offensive language was not a fighting word. The majority believed that the words of struggle are only “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are known to provoke violent reactions by nature.” In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court established the doctrine in a 9-0 decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. [3] It noted that “insults or `words of combat`, that is, those which, by their mere pronunciation, cause harm or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”, belong to the “clearly defined and narrowly defined categories of speech, their prevention and punishment. It was never thought to be a constitutional problem. According to Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of fighting words. In Terminiello v.

Chicago (1949), the court limited the doctrine of words to speech that would “create a clear and present danger of a grave and intolerable evil rising above mere inconvenience or trouble.” In that judgment, the court added context and paid attention to the content of the speech to determine when the words spoken fall within the constitutional protection or limitation of the government. In Collin v. Smith (1978), the Nazis who wore swastikas and military uniforms marching through a community with a large Jewish population, including survivors of German concentration camps, did not use combat words. The Court noted that “while it is conceivable that some listeners were prompted to retaliate when they heard the complainant`s disrespectful words, we cannot say that the complainant`s remarks were inherently so inflammatory that they fell into this small category of `fighting words`. Judge Francis W. Murphy, writing for a unanimous court, noted that Chaplinsky`s speech was outside the bounds of the First Amendment. When confronted with “obscene and obscene, blasphemous, slanderous and insulting” or `combative` words – categories of speech that have no social value or contribute to the expression of ideas – the government could restrict the expression of its opinion to avoid disruption. The state argued that Cohen`s jacket represented words of combat under Chaplinsky.

The Supreme Court disagreed, writing in its 1971 decision that the words on the jacket were not a “direct personal insult” and that no one reacted violently to the jacket.