According to the provisions of the Federal Civil Code, which governs the person examined in this article, the following elements are apparent: substantive rights, duties and free will.51 The Federal Constitution uses, inter alia, the term “person” in articles 5, 13, 14, 16, 20, sections V and IX to designate both natural persons and companies that consider them to be subjects of law. govern the general assumptions of these commandments. On the basis of these provisions, it is clear that the constitutional text refers to those who have individual rights, including legal and natural persons. Then there is the main element, which recognizes that the legal person is bound by subjective rights and guarantees. LEGAL PERSON , a collection of human beings or property that the law, in imitation of the personality of man, treats artificially as the object of rights and obligations independent of their components. The classic example of a legal entity is the corporation. Although the most well-known type of business does business, history has established businesses as vehicles for nonprofits, non-profit cooperatives, municipal and state operations, and religious and social activities. For example, in the classical Roman legal system, universities – groups of enterprises that had common treasures and had a separate legal personality from their individual members – included various municipal and religious associations as well as industrial and commercial associations. The enterprise usually has the following characteristics: a name common to all of its individuals or characteristics; a life independent of the life of its constituent parts; possession of privileges or rights, responsibilities or obligations not included in membership as an individual; and separation of ownership and management, under which the power of officers to act as representatives and representatives of the corporation is conferred, limited and determined not by the consent of the owners, but by the law itself. The chapter evaluates the rather popular claim that everything can be equipped with a legal entity. This “anything goes” view is often supported by examples such as the supposed legal personality of Indian idols and the Whanganui River in New Zealand.

The chapter reveals a fusion of the term “legal person” in a dual sense, which can refer to both the holders of legal positions (rights and obligations) and the legal positions themselves. This fusion often underpins the vision of everything, making it untenable. On the contrary, one must be able to act or capable of claiming to be considered a potential legal entity. Since rivers cannot trade or assert claims, rivers cannot be legal persons. Rather, the arrangement of the Whanganui River should be understood as giving a legal entity to a community – Maori and other sentient beings who depend on the river. The concept of legal personality is not absolute. `penetration of the corporate veil` means the consideration of natural persons acting as agents involved in an act or decision of society; This may lead to a court decision treating the rights or obligations of a company or public limited company as rights or obligations of the members or directors of that company. The claim that a company (even with the caveats above) could be a legal entity may seem far-fetched, but such claims are actually made.

Ngaire Naffine, who has classified representations of legal persons, suggests that many so-called legalistic positions – according to which legal persons are something inside the law – agree with such a view. Naffine supports the following summary of the legalistic position: “Everything can be a legal person because legal persons are fixed or defined as such. 5 That would be a non sequitur, for reasons I shall consider later; However, most of the authors whom Naffine calls legalists do not share, according to my reading, the position she attributes to them. F. H. Lawson seems to support such a position when he states that “[t]he existence of a [legal] person requires that the legislature, whether legislator, judge or jurist, or even the general public, decide to treat it as a subject of rights or other legal relationships.” Some theorists, such as Bryant Smith, argue that legal personality is nothing more than legal relationships: there is really only one class of beings unquestionably endowed with an incriminating legal personality: sane adult human beings. Most lawyers will probably agree that, under normal circumstances, it is not only possible, but also morally non-problematic, for ordinary adults to be held legally liable. However, medieval animal experimentation reminds us that contemporary restrictions on the scope of criminal law, which exclude infants and animals, for example, from its scope, are not conceptual but moral limits. Infants and animals can be held criminally liable: they can commit prohibited acts and be punished for them. Such punishments can obviously be unfair and unjust, but it`s not hard to see how animals could be punished – when it would be harder to understand what “punishing” a falling tree damaging a building would mean in the first place. Cutting the tree into small pieces might give the appearance of “retaliation,” but it would be an exaggeration to call it punishment. What for? Here, too, we cannot fully assess our obligations.

Questions such as who or what can be punished meaningfully are based on thin obligations regarding the purpose of punishment. In summary, fictional theory equates personality with the ability to exercise certain rights. It also compares legally incapable natural persons with legal persons, since both fictitious legal persons and natural persons suffering from capitis deminutio cannot exercise their will solely in the context of a legal relationship and require a representative to exercise the rights conferred on them by law. The legal meaning of the natural person (or individual) depends on whether the legal person is a necessary consequence of that person`s characteristics, so that the legal personality of a natural person does not derive from his or her human existence. Benei ha-Ir, the name of the municipality in Talmudic usage. In the Talmud, the community is considered as a collection of individuals who form its members. The legal definition of this aggregate is that of a partnership. Thus, no member of the community could testify in cases concerning the commons; He was disqualified as an interested party.

The governing body of the municipality, known as the “seven notables of the city” (shivah tovei ha-ir), was considered the representative of the citizens, and its actions were to be recognized by the citizens` assembly as an organ (bema`amad benei ha-ir; Meg. 26(a). But in 2017, the NhRP discovered that the quoted sentence from Case Law – as it actually appears in the document – contains a crucial difference from the version that ended up in Lavery. The jurisprudence actually says: “As far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being who considers that the law is capable of having rights or duties.” “Rights or obligations” – and not, as in Black`s Law Dictionary, “rights and obligations”. Of course, there is nothing conceptually strange about someone else entering into contracts on behalf of the dog, just as you can represent minors. However, when I refer here to X`s contract, I mean that X performs the legal act constituting the conclusion of the contract.